We derive distributional e¤ects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to di¤erent public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in di¤erent regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting bene…ts such as child bene…ts to one household member may not always have an e¤ect on outcomes.
Introduction
Using policy to channel resources towards certain types of individuals within households, thereby exogenously altering the intra-household distribution of income, is an instrument widely used by governments, typically to further the welfare of children. Such transfers are usually put in the hands of mothers, on the basis of the belief that additional resources to mothers, over and above the level of income they generate by choice, leads to additional resources going to children. Economic evidence on these phenomena is relatively scarce. Two reasons can be invoked to justify this. On the one hand, scarcity of data has hampered progress on this issue 1 , and on the other, suitable conceptual tools have been developed only relatively recently. In the standard 'unitary'approach to household behavior, for instance, income is pooled at the household level and the identity of the recipient is irrelevant. Thus the issue of 'targeting'bene…ts to one household member can only be analysed outside the unitary framework.
Non unitary models can be classi…ed into two broad categories, depending on whether they assume cooperation (hence Pareto e¢ ciency) or non cooperation. Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) analyse the 'targeting'issue in a cooperative context. In the non-cooperative framework, two main avenues have been explored. One relies on non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and private provision of public goods. An alternative approach, introduced by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) (LP) relies on a 'separate spheres'approach, whereby in the absence of cooperation each individual within the household specializes into speci…c tasks (for instance, those that are 'traditionally'assigned to their gender). While intuitively appealing, the notion of 'separate spheres'has not been given a sound theoretical underpinning.
The main goal of the present contribution is to extend existing results, and to clarify the links between the 'Nash equilibrium' and 'separate spheres' approaches. In doing this we provide a framework which contains all current suggestions as special cases. We consider a model in which agents decide on the provision of several public goods; in this context, we analyse the Nash equilibrium with voluntary contributions. Our most important result is that in general there is at most one public good to which both agents contribute. Hence all public commodities, but possibly one, are exclusively provided by one agent only. We show that whether the two partners contribute to disjoint sets of public goods or to sets that have one good in common depends solely on preferences and the allocation of income within the household. Finally we show that if preferences and the intra-household distribution of income are such that both contribute to a common good, then an extension of the local income pooling result of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al (1986) holds. Speci…cally, in this case household demands for all goods are independent of individual incomes and only depend on aggregate household resources. The alternative case is that the sets of public goods to which each person contributes are disjoint; in this case the allocation of income matters. It is the latter that we interpret to be the 'sepa-rate spheres'model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993) which can thus be seen as a sub-case of the general, non-cooperative approach. Individual specialization, in this context, need not be assumed initially; rather, it emerges endogenously as an equilibrium feature. Finally, the de…nition of the individual 'spheres' is endogenous; we show how it is determined by individual preferences and the within household distribution of income.
Although one can interpret the LP separate spheres as stated in the last paragraph, it is not clear that this is the interpretation that Lundberg and Pollak (1993) have. They emphasise 'traditional gender roles'whereas our model implies that when the two partners contribute to di¤erent public goods, the actual sets depend on the within household allocation of income and tastes which have no social gender speci…c analogue. The two interpretations have radically di¤erent empirical implications. First, separate spheres (disjoint contributions) in our model is a local phenomenon; for di¤erent allocations of income within the household we might or might not have separate spheres. When we do not have separate spheres then we have local income pooling. Conversely, for LP, separate spheres holds for all allocations of income within the household and we would never observe local income pooling. Second, the LP interpretation implies that we should see all wives and all husbands acting in the same way in respect to contributions to public goods (since the de…nitions of the spheres is societal) whereas our interpretation would have that although husbands and wives will may contribute to disjoint sets of public goods, the mix of these will vary across households.
Two additional remarks can be made. First, our result has a wider bearing than intra-household allocation, as the Nash equilibrium is often used to represent situations involving large number of agents and of goods, for instance the provision of public goods in society. Second, the scope of our conclusions is not limited to non-cooperative models. Several existing contributions consider cooperative models based on bargaining, with individual outside options modeled as stemming from non-cooperative solutions. Then the local income pooling result implies local income pooling in the bargaining outcomes, at least whenever the underlying non-cooperative outcomes exhibits this feature.
2 Nash equilibrium with voluntary contributions to the public goods
Framework
We consider a two person (J = A; B with A being a 'she'and B being a 'he') household which faces …xed prices and allocates a given income between di¤erent goods. Agent J has income Y J , and Y = Y A +Y B denotes the household's total income. We assume in all that follows that goods are either public or private household allocation of goods. Denote person J's n vector of their private good by q J and let the m vector of public goods be denoted Q. Let q = q A + q B be the vector of household consumption of the private good. Prices of private (resp. public) goods are denoted p = (p 1 ; :::; p n ) (resp. P = (P 1 ; :::; P m )) The household budget constraint is:
Preferences are assumed to be egoistic, in the sense that each person's utility function is de…ned over public goods and the individual's private consumption, J q J ; Q . 
De…nition
In the Nash equilibrium with voluntary contributions to the public goods, each individual chooses how to allocate their income between the private goods and the amounts they contribute to the public goods, given the level of contributions of the other individual to the public goods. The household's expenditure on a public good is the sum of the individual contributions to that public good. 4 A solution in this problem is a vector of contributions to the public goods (g A ; g B ) such that each individual's belief are con…rmed in equilibrium, that is such that (q J ; g J ); J = A; B are solutions of the programs:
This program can be rewritten equivalently in terms of private goods and of public goods for the household. For A: 8 < :
One can write a similar program for B, with B choosing the quantity of private goods he consumes and the quantity of public goods the household consumes in equilibrium. Under standard properties (continuous di¤erentiability, strict quasi concavity), an equilibrium always exists in this game.
Properties of the Nash equilibrium
We now study the features of Nash equilibria in this context. We say that member A contributes to public good j if g 
as well as the budget constraint:
These three, algebraically independent equations in two unknowns are generically incompatible. Speci…cally, let A ; B denote a solution to equations (4) and (5); assume that the determinant
is non zero at p; P;
A ; B . Then the solution A ; B is locally unique. Moreover, A ; B fails to satisfy condition (6) except for one speci…c value y of y, namely:
We conclude that a solution fails to exist for almost all y.
Note that the result is only 'general' (or 'generic'), in the sense that it is 'almost always'satis…ed. Still, it is possible, for arbitrary preferences, that it is violated at speci…c points (but then typically these points are locally unique). Also, one can …nd preferences such that the result is violated upon an open set. This is the case, for instance, when public goods are separable and (sub) preferences over the public goods are identical across individuals, a case studied in Lechene and Preston (2005) ; in that case, the determinant D is identically null. Note, however, that such preferences are not robust to local perturbations.
A precise statement of these 'genericity' conditions would require some heavy mathematical apparatus (transversality theory) that is outside the scope of this paper; instead, a detailed example is provided below.
The
A ; q B ; Q satis…es n+p 1 …rst order conditions for A, n+m p …rst order conditions for B plus the global budget constraint. None of these conditions depend on individual incomes (all but the last do not depend on incomes at all and the last only depends on aggregate income). Hence the set of solutions does not depend on individual incomes. Proposition 2 generalizes the remarkable result …rst obtained by Warr (1983) in the case of one public good, then also by Kemp (1984) , and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) for several public goods. 5 It shows, in particular, that a given household may or may not pool income; in fact, pooling behavior obtains endogenously as the outcome of non-cooperation for certain ranges of the relevant parameters. A heterogeneous sample of households may therefore contain "pooling" and "non-pooling" households, a fact which has important implications for empirical work.
Proposition 1 is more original. It states that in a non-cooperative setting, individuals specialize in funding public goods, so that all public goods but maybe one, are exclusively funded by one individual. Proposition 1 can thus be interpreted as a 'separate spheres' result: in practice, each publicly consumed commodity (but maybe one) belongs exclusively to the 'sphere of in ‡uence'of one of the household members.
Two remarks are however in order. First, in contrast with Lundberg and Pollak's approach, respective spheres are endogenously determined. Speci…cally, for any equilibrium vector q A ; q B ; Q , for any public good j which is consumed, we have the following characterization (assuming that both people buy the …rst private good): In other words, for all public goods but possibly one, the marginal willingness to pay (out of private consumption) of one of the partners is smaller than the marginal cost.
The second remark is that the de…nition of the 'spheres' is not …xed; it depends on individual incomes. For instance, when a member's income is low enough, this member will in general contribute to no public good. This implies that any change in income distribution that a¤ect the members's respective incomes may change the de…nition of the spheres. A precise illustration is given below in a speci…c example.
Before turning to the example, we discuss brie ‡y the possible implications of this analysis if agents use a bargaining models that takes the non-cooperative outcome as a breakdown point. In this case the bargaining outcomes inherit some of the features of the non-cooperative outcomes. In particular, the same segments of local pooling will hold for all goods.
An example
We now study an example with one private good and two public goods (denoted G and H for simplicity). Individual preferences are Cobb-Douglas:
We denote by A's income by and B's by (1 ). We are particularly interested in analyzing changes in demand resulting from variations in the income share (keeping total income constant at unity). We assume, as a normalization, that a > b so that A cares (relatively) more for commodity G and B cares (relatively) more for commodity H. The …rst order conditions give:
with an equality when the agents contributes to the commodity under consideration. Now assume, …rst, that A is contributing to G and that B is contributing to H. Then
If, moreover, A also contributes to H, then
and B cannot simultaneously contribute to both public goods unless a = b . This is exactly the meaning of the 'in general' quali…cation in the statement of Proposition 1: such a condition is 'almost never' satis…ed, and when it is the situation is 'knife-edge'and not robust to in…nitesimal perturbations (here, in…nitesimal changes in the parameters).
The exact solutions as a function of are given by:
then A contributes to no public good, B contributes to both public goods and
then A contributes to G, B contributes to G and H, and
Note that, in that case, demand does not depend on , as stated in Proposition 2, since both agents contribute to G.
then A contributes to G, B contributes to H, and
This is the 'pure separate sphere'case, in which each public good is funded by one agent. …nally, if ( + a + 1) + + a + < then A contributes to G and H, B contributes to no public good, and
It is simple to show that the outcomes are ine¢ cient for all values of 2 (0; 1). At the endpoints the outcomes are e¢ cient since then one or other person is a dictator. If we take a bargaining model which has the non-cooperative outcomes as a breakdown point then the household demands for both public goods will be higher than in the non-cooperative case (with equality at the endpoints). Importantly, the bargaining outcomes will then have intervals of income pooling over the same values of as the non-cooperative case.
These results are summarized in …gure 1, in which the horizontal axis represents the values of and the vertical axis the expenditures on the two public goods. We take values of fa; ; b; g = f5=3; 8=9; 15=32; 1=2g which gives 'join'points at = f1=8; 1=3; 1=2; 2=3g. In interval I person A does not contribute to either public good. As income is transferred to her she spends it on her private good and B cuts back expenditures on both public goods and his private good. Thus we see that expenditure on good G falls even though person A cares relatively more for this good. As an example, transferring income from father to mother will not necessarily lead to higher expenditures on children even if the mother cares more for the children. At the value = 1=8 person A starts to contribute to good G and we enter an interval of income pooling (II). As even more income is transferred to A we reach a point ( = 1=3 in this case) at which B stops contributing to good G. This gives the pure separate spheres interval III. Intervals IV and V are obvious counterparts to II and I respectively. This …gure shows many of the important features of our model:
Local income pooling will hold for some values of the distribution of income but not for others. The household demands for public goods are not necessarily monotone in the distribution of income, even if one partner cares relatively more for one good than the other.
The join points for the di¤erent regimes are the same across all goods (we do not show the private good expenditures but this property holds for them as well; see the conditions above). This is potentially important for empirical work; without this property, the chances of successfully devising powerful tests for the patterns displayed here would be remote. On the other hand, if preferences vary across women (di¤erent a and for di¤erent households) and across men (di¤erent b and for di¤erent households) then the join points themselves will be heterogeneous which will have to be taken into account.
Conclusion
We have considered a non-cooperative model of household allocation to di¤er-ent goods. We have shown that if preferences are egoistic then the voluntary contributions game gives two distinct regimes for household behaviour. In the …rst regime there is one public good to which both partners contribute and we have local income pooling. In the second regime, the two partners contribute to distinct sets of public goods (separate spheres) and a local re-distribution of income will lead to a change in household demands. One important corollary of the latter is that a reallocation to A may lead to a decrease in the household demand for the public good that A values most. This analysis also has implications for bargaining models if the household uses the non-cooperative outcomes suggested here as a breakdown point. In that case the bargaining outcomes will inherit the local income pooling from the non-cooperative model. Moreover, the analysis also implies the strong restriction that the only distribution factor 6 is relative income.
Allowing for caring (so that A's preferences are represented by a weighted sum of her felicity function and his felicity function and similarly for B) leaves the analysis unchanged, except that we add ‡at (local income pooling) segments to the demands for all goods at extreme values of the household distribution of income (that is, close to zero or unity). This follows since at such values the high income and caring person will be e¤ectively transferring resources to the low income partner and any local re-distribution is simply undone. These regions of income pooling are analguous to those that arise in the Rotten Kid Theorem which also relies on one person having most of the resources and caring for the one with low resources. Once again, any bargaining model will inherit these ‡ats at extreme values of the within household income distribution.
The positive and policy implications of our analysis are quite sharp: even if households do not have a common utility function (the unitary model) they may exhibit local income pooling for some values of the within household distribution of income. When they do not pool income locally it must be that they are contributing to separate spheres. The exact importance of the local income pooling intervals and the separate spheres intervals will depend on preferences.
For some values of preferences we may have that the household will almost never respond to changes in the within household allocation of income and that targeting income will have little e¤ect. We end by emphasising that we stress the 'may' in the preceding sentences. We do not make the general claim that we believe redistribution or targeting does not matter in general -alternative theories to the ones we have analysed here (e.g., cooperative approaches) will give more or less income pooling and potential for targeting. Whether or not households pool income (locally or globally) is, in the end, an empirical issue.
